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I construct an optimal growth model with overlapping dynasties to investigate how much
the rate at which an economy absorbs new immigrant dynasties could motivate current
voters to favour greater reliance on de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nance of government expenditures through
intertemporal shifts in factor taxation. The model demonstrates that even if voters are
altruistically linked to their descendants, rising immigration, coupled with declining birth
rates may explain the growth in public debt and unfunded liabilities in the United States
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Ordinarily, in an economy in which taxes are distortionary, heavy reliance on decit nance
to fund government expenditure combined with sustained increases in unfunded liabilities, rel-
ative to the size of the economy, might be hard to reconcile with the prescriptions of optimal
scal policy. Yet it is precisely this type of scally imbalanced policy that both national and
local governments throughout much of the developed world have been pursuing for decades.
This paper examines how though dierent generations may be altruistically linked, the
existence of immigrant ows will encourage a government that represents the interests of today's
population to favor decit nance and low taxes for long periods of time, even if such policies will
eventually necessitate far higher tax rates in the future, to nance the additional accumulated
debt. The model I build to demonstrate and measure this bias in favour of decits is an optimal
growth model with overlapping dynasties, factor taxation and public debt, calibrated for the
US economy.
In 1946, a year after the end of World War II, gross US federal debt reached 119.0% of GDP.
For thirty-ve years, the debt burden declined steadily, reaching only 31.0% in 1981. Since then,
during the three decades that followed, the debt has more than tripled and has exceeded 100%
since 2012. Publicly held, or net, debt has risen nearly as fast; from 24.6% of annual GDP in
1981, it reached 73.7% at the end of 2015.1 All indications suggest the debt burden, by either
measure, will continue to grow for the foreseeable future.
Each year, the US Congressional Budget Oce produces two dierent estimates of future
spending, revenue, and the predicted trajectory of US Federal Government publicly held debt
for the decades to come. The rst is the Extended Baseline Forecast, which is premised on
four main assumptions: that the Federal Government will contain entitlement spending; that
growth in non-entitlement spending will no longer keep pace with the growth in the economy
as it has in the past; that temporary tax cuts which are set to expire will no longer be renewed
1Gross debt includes intergovernmental holding of debt, particularly in the Social Security Trust Fund, re-
ecting a portion of the unfunded liabilities of the Federal Government.
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even if they have been renewed more than once in the past; and that future tax brackets
will be automatically indexed to ination, as they have been since 1985, but not adjusted to
reect real income growth in the economy. Though the population is aging and the bill for
Medicare is driving total expenditure higher, the Extended Baseline Forecast for 2015 shows
revenue growing as well (Figure 1), particularly because of its assumption of limited indexing.
Meanwhile, Figure 2 shows publicly held debt as forecast in 2015, exceeding 100% of GDP by
2039, and 181% by 2090.
Along with the Extended Baseline Forecast, the CBO produces an Alternative Fiscal Sce-
nario. Here the CBO assumes Medicare costs will rise much as they have in the past; that those
temporary tax cuts which are typically renewed as a matter of course will again not be allowed
to expire; and that other Federal spending will continue to grow at the same rate as the econ-
omy. Most important, it assumes that as incomes rise faster than prices, Congress will prevent
so-called `real bracket creep' from turning increasing numbers of people into high marginal rate
tax payers. In this scenario, public debt grows along an explosive path. In 2010 the Alternative
Fiscal Scenario had the debt burden reaching 233% of GDP by 2040, and 947% of GDP by
2084. In 2011, the CBO predicted the debt to GDP ratio would reach 195% by 2036, but
declined to extrapolate any further, arguing that the economy could not sustain a debt burden
any higher. By 2015 the predicted accumulation of debt in the Alternative Fiscal Scenario had
slowed slightly, reaching 200% in 2047 and as debt service spirals higher, 250%|after 2054|the
CBO's new threshold of unsustainability.
One way to distinguish between the two sets of predictions is that under the Extended
Baseline Forecast, while tax revenue so far has proven inadequate to preclude the rise in debt
over the previous thirty-ve years, tax rates will rise in the near future in part to pay for
entitlements and also to nance interest payments on the higher level of debt. Under the
Alternative Fiscal Scenario, the rise in tax rates is postponed indenitely. In either case,
given the convex relationship between rates of taxation and the excess burdens they generate,
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the current policy of maintaining relatively low taxation now, even as the liabilities that will
necessitate far higher future taxes to nance them continue to mount, is a puzzle.
There is a wide-ranging literature exploring the many reasons why governments, even ab-
stracting from distributional issues, might not adopt rst or even second-best scal policies.
If agents are indierent to the next generation's welfare, they will of course support policies
that shift the burden of funding government expenditure to the future. Even if agents are not
indierent to their childrens' welfare, but some are bequest-constrained, as in Cukierman and
Meltzer (1989), a constituency in favour of decit nance can emerge. Alternatively, political
institutions may generate a whole host of external eects or principal-agent problems that yield
suboptimal policies.2
Yet government budgets are not always in decit. Why did the governments of advanced na-
tions set about reducing the debt burdens incurred during World War II through a combination
of primary surpluses, real growth, ination and nancial repression (Reinhart and Sbrancia,
2011) until sometime between the mid-1970's and the early 1980's? Buchanan and Wagner
(1977) argued that the widespread adoption of Keynesian analysis provides intellectual cover
for policy makers to indulge their inclination to spend but not to tax. An alternative explana-
tion, popular with political commentators and journalists, combines intergenerational conict
and shifting cultural norms. According to this `selsh generation' hypothesis, today's adults are
less willing to sacrice for the benet of future generations, including their own children.3 My
explanation does not rely on intergenerational selshness. Instead voters tolerate higher decit
spending only because they understand that their own children will not inherit the burden of
it alone, but will share it with future immigrants.
During the 1970's, the rate of net migration to the United States averaged 1.9 per thousand.
It rose to 2.8 during the 1980's, and then to 4.3 during the 1990's, before receding to 3.2 per
2See Persson and Svensson (1989), Tabellini and Alesina (1990), Rogo (1990), Lizzeri (1999) and Battagliani
and Coate (2008).
3See Brooks (2010), Howker and Malik (2010), Kotliko and Burns (2004) and Willetts (2010).
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thousand. Net migration has been higher in the past, averaging 6.4 per thousand during the
rst decade of the twentieth century.4 Yet the impact of immigration on the future composition
of the population is a function not only of the rate at which new immigrants arrive, but also
of the demographic characteristics of the society that absorbs them. Hence, the prevailing high
birth rates between 1870 and 1910 meant that though the United States experienced rates of net
migration that have never since been repeated, the share of the population that was foreign-born
shrank over those four decades, from 14.4% to 13.3%.5 A century later, the foreign-born share
of the population rose from 4.7% in 1970 to 13.9% in 2015, and it is predicted to reach 17.7%
by 2065.6 By then the US population is projected to grow from 324 million to 441 million, with
nearly the entire increase comprised of future immigrants or their descendants.
Others before have drawn a possible connection between growing intergenerational imbal-
ances and immigration. Employing a generational accounting framework, Auerbach and Ore-
opoulos (1999) and Storesletten (2000) consider how immigration might ameliorate or exacer-
bate scal imbalances in the United States. Bonin et al. (2000) perform similar calculations for
Germany, Storesletten (2004) for Sweden and Fehr et al. (2004) for the European Union, Japan
and the United States. The best feature of these papers is the well-articulated age structures of
the populations being modeled, something that the overlapping generations structure on which
they are based easily accommodates. At the same time these models exclude intergenerational
altruistic links. In essence everyone in an overlapping generations models begins life as an
immigrant|the new born ospring of a native and newly arrived adult immigrants dier only
in the shape and length of their earnings prole. Adopting Weil's (1989) overlapping dynasties
approach, I assume that if members of one generation already resident in the country benet
from unfunded tax cuts, they can use bequests to share their gain with their descendents, and
4Calculations based on Gibson (1975) and United States Bureau of the Census (1975)
5Ruggles et al. (2015).
6Pew Research Center, 2015. \Modern Immigration Wave Brings 59 Million to U.S., Driving Population
Growth and Change Through 2065: Views of Immigration's Impact on U.S. Society Mixed." Washington, D.C.,
p. 24.
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also compensate them for both the higher tax burden and any additional dead weight losses
that nancing the additional debt might entail.
In Section 1, I present my model, which features a continuous inow of innite-lived opti-
mizing agents. Government consumption, transfers, and debt service are nanced by taxation
on both capital and labor, as well as new bond issuance. In Section 2, I calibrate the model to
match some of the main features of the US economy. In Section 3, I consider the simplest case,
in which tax rates and government consumption as a share of output remains constant, similar
to the experience of the United States during the last half century, but transfer payments in-
crease, as they are expected to for the next several decades while public debt accumulates. The
debt only stabilises when the tax on labour earnings is raised to service it. Here, in the absence
of immigration, the intertemporal shifts in either the tax rate on wages or transfer payments is
welfare neutral|i.e., Ricardian equivalence prevails.
Immigration alters these calculations. The anticipation that new people will join the econ-
omy in the future, and assume responsibility for nancing a share of however much debt the
government has accumulated in the interim, creates an incentive on the part of the initial popu-
lation to postpone taxes for as long as possible. Indeed, this eect is expressed through the way
higher public debt raises the rate of return on the economy's asset returns. Ben-Gad (2004),
(2008) demonstrates how inows of immigrants raise the rate of return for native-owned capital
and generate immigration surpluses. Here, higher levels of debt amplify this eect.
In Section 4, I consider intertemporal shifts in the tax on asset income. First, any deviations
from a policy that smooths a distortionary tax inate its associated excess burden. Second,
because the supply of capital is inelastic in the short run but innitely elastic in the long run,
immediate increases in tax rates can be welfare-improving, provided the subsequent surpluses
are used to reduce public debt and facilitate lower rates of taxation in the future. The impact
of immigration, even at very low levels, easily overwhelms both these eects. Policy makers
focused on serving the interests of the people already resident in the country will balance the
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Figure 1: US federal budgets from 1946 to 2015 with forecasts using extended baseline and
alternative scal scenarios generated by the Congressional Budget Oce for 2016 to 2090.
desired shift in the tax burden towards future immigrants, against the eciency losses generated
by deviating from a policy of tax smoothing, or of forgoing the option to exploit the lump-sum
nature of short-term capital taxation. These trade-os mean that the scope for improving native
welfare through this channel is more limited, though the optimal level of debt is still very high.
In Section 5, I consider the behaviour of the model when decit nance is accompanied by
a shift in the the tax burden between the two factors of production. First, cuts in the tax on
labour or higher transfer payments generate prolonged decits, but the government ultimately
relies on higher taxes on asset income to achieve budget balance. I also consider the opposite|
lower capital taxation is balanced by eventually higher taxes on wages. This not only shifts
some of the tax burden from natives to immigrants, but generates for the former a secondary
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Figure 2: Breakdown of US gross federal debt from 1946 to 2015 (Oce of Management and
Budget) with forecasts using extended baseline and alternative scal scenarios for publicly held
debt generated by the Congressional Budget Oce for 2016 to 2090.
gain through the permanent reduction of a highly distortionary tax.7
1 The Basic Model
Consider an economy that is closed in every way but one: new people|adult immigrants|are
arriving from abroad at a continuous rate ofm (t) : These new immigrants are founding members
of new innite-lived dynasties, each indexed by s 2 R, the date at which the dynasties' founding
members crossed the international frontier to instantaneously join the economy as workers,
consumers, and savers. The economic environment is assumed to be deterministic, and the
7In the overlapping dynasty model presented below, the population absorbing new immigrants are themselves
members of families that have accumulated through past immigration. I use the term natives to refer to all
previous cohorts of immigrants and their descendants as distinct from new arrivals.
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behaviour of each agent, including each new immigrant and all of his or her descendants, can
be characterized as the maximization of a dynasty's innite horizon discounted utility function
beginning at time s:
max
c;h
Z 1
s
e( n)(s t) ln c (s; t) dt; (1)
subject to a time t budget constraint:

a(s; t) = (1  h (t))w(t) (s; t) + ((1  k (t)) r(t)  n) a(s; t)  c(s; t) + q(s; t) 8s; t  s; (2)
and the transversality condition:
lim
t!1 e
  R ts ((1 k(v))r(v) n)dva(s; t) = 0 8s; t  s; (3)
where  is the subjective discount rate, n is the rate of natural population growth (the rate at
which each dynasty itself is growing), c(s; t), q(s; t) and a (s; t) are consumption, income received
from government transfer payments, and holdings of assets for the members of dynasties of
vintage s at time t  s, and r(t) is the rate of return on assets at time t. The assets a (s; t) for
each household are the sum of holdings of physical capital k(s; t) and government debt b(s; t),
and the returns on these assets are taxed at the rate of k (t). Labour supply is inelastically
supplied and normalised to one. It earns an economy-wide wage rate of w(t) multiplied by
 (s; t) which represents the time t productivity of workers who are members of vintage s
households. These earnings are taxed at the rate h (t). Taxes as well as the proceeds from
the sale of government debt, net of the payment of interest and principal, nance both the
transfer payments and government consumption|the latter I assume to be a share g(t) of
domestic output, net of capital depreciation. The solution to the optimization problem yields
the evolution of consumption for each individual dynasty s over time:
c (s; t) = c (s; s) e(s t)e
R t
s (1 k(v))r(v)dv: (4)
I assume that productivity is the product of two components, an economy wide trend growing
at rate x, and a static term associated with the members of each dynasty of vintage s, so that
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 (s; t) =  (s) ext. The economy-wide feasibility and government's budget constraints are
_K(t) = (1  g(t))  F  K(t); ext(t)  K(t)  K(t)  C(t) + P (t)m (t) k(t; t); (5)
_B(t) = g(t)
 
F
 
K(t); ext(t)
  K(t)+Q(t)  h(t)w(t)ext(t)
 k(t)r(t) [K (t) +B (t)] + r(t)B(t) + P (t)m (t) b(t; t); (6)
where C(t) = ent
R t
 1 e
R s
0 m(v)dvm (s) c(s; t)ds represents aggregate consumption, B(t) =
ent
R t
 1 e
R s
0 m(v)dvm (s) b(s; t)ds publicly held government debt, Q(t) = ent
R t
 1 e
R s
0 m(v)dvm (s) q(s; t)ds
aggregate transfer payments, (t) = ent
R t
 1 e
R s
0 m(v)dvm (s) (s)ds a weighted aggregation of
productivity across the dierent dynasties and P (t) = ent
R t
 1 e
R s
0 m(v)dvm (s) ds the size of the
population. The function F : R2++ ! R++ is homogeneous of degree one, and describes how
the inputs, aggregate capital K (t) = ent
R t
 1 e
R s
0 m(v)dvm (s) k(s; t)ds, which depreciates at the
rate , and aggregate eective labor ext(t), produce a single good that is either consumed by
households, or the government, or invested in the production of more capital. The terms b(t; t)
and k(t; t) represent any assets, in the form of either bonds or capital, that new immigrants
arriving at time t may import with them.
Assume transfer payments evolve over time according to q(s; t) = % (t)  (s) ext (transfer pay-
ments directly relate to the amount paid in contributions through the tax on labour earnings).
Then, integrating the rst order conditions of the individual maximization problem and the
time t budget constraint over time, the consumption rule for dynasty s at time t is:
c (s; t) =
  n
1 + 
( (s)!(t) + a(s; t) ) 8s; t  s; (7)
where !(t) =
R1
t e
xu R ut ((1 k(v))r(v) n)dv [(1  h (u))w(u) + % (u)]w(u)du is the component of
households' present discounted value of net labor and transfer income from time t forward that
is invariant to dynasty vintage.
Aggregating (7) over all dynasties that have arrived by time t, dierentiating with respect
to t; and substituting (5) and (6), aggregate consumption evolves according to:
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_C (t) = [(1  k (t)) r(t)  + n]C (t) + m (t)P (t) C (t)
(t)
 (t)
+
  n
1 + 
P (t)m (t)

b(t; t) + k(t; t)  B (t)
(t)
 (t)  K (t)
(t)
 (t)

: (8)
Rewriting (8), (5) and (6) in terms of stationary per-capita variables:

~c (t) = [(1  k (t)) r(t)    x] ~c (t)  (  n)m (t) P (t)  (t)
 (t)

 (t)~b (t) +  (t) ~k (t)

; (9)

~k (t) = (1  g(t))
h
F

~k(t); 1

  
i
  (n+ x) ~k(t)  ~c(t) m (t) P (t)  (t)
 (t)
(t)~k(t); (10)

~b (t) = g(t)
h
F

~k(t); 1

  ~k(t)
i
+ ~q (t)  h(t)w(t)  k(t)r(t)~k (t) (11)
+ ((1  k(t)) r(t)  n  x)~b(t) m (t) P (t)  (t)
 (t)
 (t)~b (t) ;
where ~c (t)= C(t)ext(t) ,
~k (t)= K(t)ext(t) ,
~b (t)= B(t)ext(t) , ~q (t)=
Q(t)
ext(t) ; (t) =
k(t) k(t;t)
k(t) is the fractional
dierence between per-capita physical capital and the physical capital owned by new immigrants
at the moment of their arrival, and (t) = b(t) b(t;t)b(t) the analogous terms for government debt.
Both input factors receive their marginal products:
r(t) = Fk

~k(t); 1

  ; (12)
w(t) = F 

~k(t); 1

: (13)
The present value of future government borrowing is limited by a transversality condition:
lim
t!1e
  R t0 (1 k(v))r(v)dvB(t); (14)
which implies that the time-discounted budget must remain balanced over the long run. In
terms of per-capita stationary variables this is:
~b(0) =
Z 1
0
e 
R t
0 (1 k(v))r(v)dv
h
h(t)w(t) + k(t)r(t)~k (t)  g(t)
h
F

~k(t); 1

  ~k(t)
ii
dt: (15)
The system (9), (10) and (11), together with the government's long-run budget constraint
(15), describes the behaviour of the economy, where the products of m (t) with P (t)(t)(t) and both
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 (t) and  (t) regulate the impact of immigration on the economy. If  (t)=0 and  (t)=0, new
immigrants are identical to members of the already resident population, and changes in the rate
of immigration have no eect on per-capita variables in this model.
Finally, the production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form:
F
 
K(t); ext(t)

= K(t)
 
ext(t)
1 
:
2 Calibrating the Model
Fifty years after its passage, the provisions of the Hart-Cellar Immigration Act of 1965 still form
the basis of present US immigration policy. The act removed the country quotas rst enacted
in the Immigration Restriction Act of 1921, and made the category of family unication, rst
introduced in the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act of 1952, the main route for permanent
settlement in the United States. Though it followed passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
coincided with the largest expansion in the scope of the welfare state since the Great Depression,
particularly the creation of the Medicare and Medicaid programmes, at the time Hart-Cellar
was not perceived as a major shift in overall US policy. Indeed, if during the fourteen years
from 1952 through 1965 annual net migration to the United States averaged 1.7 per thousand,
during the subsequent fourteen-year period from 1966 through 1979 it was 2.0.
Beginning in 1980, immigration rose sharply, initially the result of a large increase in the
number of refugees and asylum seekers from Cuba and Indochina, and passage of the Refugee
Act that same year. Subsequent legislation, including the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986, provided an amnesty to three million undocumented aliens, and the Immigration Act
of 1990 had the eect of increasing legal immigration by thirty-ve percent.
Yet it is important to emphasise that it is not rising rates of immigration alone, but rather
their juxtaposition against declining rates of natural population growth, as seen in Figure 3, that
generates or reinforces a bias in favour of decit nance. From its post-war maximum of just over
16.4 per thousand in 1947, the rate of natural increase had dropped to just under 5.5 by 1973,
12
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Figure 3: Left Axis: Annual rates of net immigration (marked by ) and natural population
growth (marked by ) in the United States from 1946 to 2015 (connected by solid lines) and
US Census projections for the components of change: 2016 to 2060. Right Axis: Total rate
of fertility in the United States from 1947 to 2015 (marked by solid lines ) and US Census
Projections for 2016 to 2060 (dashed lines ). Sources: OECD and US Census.
and it is projected to continue to decline till the middle of the century. Immigration is already
the direct source of nearly forty percent of US population growth, and it is projected to exceed
fty percent in 2023. Aside from the two year period during 2006 and 2007, since 1972 the total
fertility rate in the United States has fallen below the replacement rate of 2.11 per thousand, and
the projections prepared by the US Census suggest it will stabilise at 1.86 per thousand in 2031.
Furthermore, these aggregate rates understate the full contribution immigration makes to long-
run population growth and the future composition of the population, as they ignore the relative
youth of new immigrants and abstract from dierences in total fertility rates between them
and their native counterparts. For example, new immigrants who arrived between 1965 and
2015 and their US-born descendants accounted for 55% of the 131 million additional people
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added to the United States population during that period.8 If, as predicted, over the next
fty years the population grows by only 117 million, but 88% of this growth is attributed to
immigrants and their descendants, the equivalent rate of eective net migration will amount
to 9.7 per thousand.9 It is this rate, which reects the impact of immigration on the future
size and composition of the population, rather than the published annual rate of net migration,
that is most relevant for determining what scal policy is most advantageous for the population
already resident in the country.
It took time before the changes in immigration policy signied by passage of Hart-Cellar
became apparent. The combined share of rst and second generation immigrants declined in
every census from 1910 at 34.7% to 16.5% in 1980. Only then does it begin to rise, reaching
25.8% in 2015 and according to projections will reach 36% by 2065.10 Similarly, the passage
of legislation that year which expanded the scope of welfare spending generated, along with
changing demographics, a gradual rise in transfer payments over decades rather than one sharp
increase. Indeed, the debt-to-GDP ratio continued its postwar decline before stabilising dur-
ing the late 1970's. Furthermore, although the growing gap between expenditures on transfer
payments and tax receipts on labour earnings is what largely drives projections of future expo-
nential growth in the debt burden, until very recently, both rose in tandem. Instead, from the
early 1980's onward, it is the decline in the tax rate on asset income that generated most of
the increase in debt in Figure 2. Therefore, to calibrate the model, I use long-run averages for
the years between 1966 and 2014, but to set the initial value of the tax rate on asset income,
I average over the period between 1966 to 1980. As the aim of this work is to explain both
the rise in public debt over recent decades, and its projected increase in the decades to come, I
solve for steady state values that are consistent with the ratio of public debt to output during
1981, rather than taking an average across the entire period. Labour supply in the model is
8Pew Research Center, op. cit., p. 24.
9Ibid. p.23.
10Ibid.
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inelastic, so the value of transfers, net of tax receipts from labour earnings, serves as a residual,
and is set to ensure that the government's budget is initially balanced.
I follow the procedure in Mendoza et al. (1994), Cooley and Prescott (1995) and Gomme
and Rupert (2007) to calculate the tax rates on labour earnings (total compensation) and on the
return to capital (which includes the implicit return on the stock of consumer durables), except
the tax is imposed on returns net of depreciation. Output includes both gross domestic product
and the imputed services from consumer durables, and between 1966 and 2014 was on average
8.06% higher than GDP alone. The growth rate of its per-capita value, x, averaged 0.018 per
annum. The share of government consumption and investment g out of net output averaged
0.232. The share of capital income in output, , including net interest payments, prots, and
rental income, as well as the identical share of proprietors' income together averaged 0.377.
In 1981, the stock of US public debt corresponded to 24.6% of GDP, which implies a debt-to-
output ratio of 0.227, in terms of our more broadly dened output. Between 1966 and 1981 the
imputed tax rates on asset income averaged 0.320. I x the overall rate of population growth
to its long-run average rate of 10.2 per thousand throughout, and vary the share of that growth
generated by immigration. I assume =1 and =1|immigrants arrive in the United States
after having exhausted during their passage whatever assets they might have owned.
Finally, I assume the term (t) which captures the productivity of new immigrants of vintage
t relative to the veteran population, evolves according to (t) = e 
R t
0 (v)dv. If both the rate of
immigrationm (t) and the parameter  (v) are constant, the dierence between the productivity
of newly arrived immigrants and the average productivity of the current stock of workers is equal
to = (  m). To determine this value, I use the 5% public use micro samples for the years
1980, 1990 and 2000, and survey data from the American Community Survey for each of the
years from 2001 to 2014, to estimate simple wage equations in semi-logarithmic form for people
in the labour force between the ages of 16 and 64.11 Controlling for age, and interpolating the
11Ruggles et al. (2015).
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results for the years between 1980 and 1990 and then from 1990 to 2000, the imputed wage rate
for newly arrived immigrants (ve years or less in the United States) is on average 17.5% below
that of all other workers. Rather than xing the value of  to one value, in each simulation, as
the rate of net migration is varied,  is set to match this nding.
3 Intertemporal Shifts in Labour Taxation and Transfers
I start with labour taxation and transfers because intertemporal shifts in either are the simplest
to interpret. This is because transfer payments and tax revenue collected on labour earnings
enter the model directly only through (11), and only aect the behaviour of the economy through
the changes generated by the dierence between them in the size of the public debt. In fact,
only when the economy is absorbing new immigrants does the rate of tax on labour earnings,
transfers or the size of the debt in (9) aect consumption, investment or the rate of return to
capital.
Government spending on transfer payments has risen steadily for decades, tripling from 6.1%
of GDP in 1966 to 18.3% in 2014. Yet only in recent years has the tax revenue collected on
labour earnings failed to keep pace. Nonetheless, as the average age of the population continues
to rise, it is the expectation that the gap between the two will continue to widen that drives
projected future increases in debt in Figure 2. In all likelihood, any policy of scal consolidation
designed to eventually stabilise the burden of debt will involve increases in the tax rate on wage
income (through higher FICA contributions to stabilise the Social Security Trust Fund) rather
than cuts to the overall amount spent on transfer programmes, so my analysis focuses on this
scenario. However, unlike in the sections that follow, here this distinction is not economically
meaningful.
In keeping with the time scales in Figures 1 and 2, I assume a very high degree of policy
stickiness|the period between the initial rise in transfers until the moment of scal consolida-
tions when taxes must rise to satisfy (15) lasts T = 40 years. This baseline case roughly matches
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Figure 4: Impulse responses for the net rate of return, change in basis points, for dierent
annual rates of immigration, after increasing transfer payments by 1.5% of output and then
raising the tax rate on wage earnings in T=40 or 70 years.
a rise in transfer spending, net of labour tax receipts, that commence at the beginning of this
decade, with debt accruing faster than the growth rate of the economy till around mid-century,
when according to the Alternative Fiscal Scenario published by the CBO the debt will exceed
what it deems to be the unsustainable level corresponding to 250% of output. I also consider
larger values of T = 55 and T = 70, to enable ready comparisons with the policy of shifting
the tax rate on capital income in Section 4|a policy that began in the early 1980's and was
responsible for most of the increase in the debt so far.
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To oer but one example, suppose spending on transfers in (11) permanently increases by
the equivalent of one and a half percent of initial output. The payments accrue to the population
already resident at the moment the policy changes, but in subsequent years, as new immigrants
arrive, they too receive these payments, which increase at a xed rate to keep pace with the
growing population and the economy's exogenous long-run growth rate. The more time elapses
before the tax on wages is raised to stabilise the debt, the more debt accumulates and the
larger the corresponding tax increase necessary to exactly satisfy the transversality condition
(3) and the government's intertemporal budget constraint (15). That means that after the
scal consolidation in period T , the new long-run tax rate on wages is adjusted permanently
to continue funding the higher transfer payments as well as the xed share of government
expenditure in net output, and to service both the stock of pre-existing public debt and any
additional public debt that has accumulated in the interim.
For each value of T and rate of immigration m, the third column in Table 1 lists the
changes to the debt burden by period T .12 After T = 40 years, the additional accumulated
debt is equivalent to 103.2% of output if the rate of immigration is zero, but climbs in small
increments as the rate of immigration is increased to 105.3% if the rate of immigration is ten
per thousand. The fourth column captures the small changes to the long-run debt burden, if
any, that occur after T as the capital stock and output converge. The stabilisation of the debt
burden is accomplished by raising the rate of tax on labour from its initial value of 0.242 from
T onwards, and the new tax rates that accompany scal consolidation are listed in the fth
column and range from 0.306 to 0.31. If we raise the value of T to 55 years, so that the increase
in transfer payments either commences fteen years earlier or scal consolidation is postponed
by an additional fteen years, the economy accumulates additional long-run debt that range
between 177.6% and 182.5% of output, and the corresponding labour tax rates necessary to
12To capture the non-linearities of the transition paths, I assemble Pade approximants of order (2,1) using rst,
second and third order perturbations of the dynamic system (9), (10) and (11) to generate all impulse responses.
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service it ranges between 0.337 and 0.343. Increase the value of T to 70 and the corresponding
increments to the debt burden and long-run tax rates range between 285.9% and 299.6%, and
0.381 and 0.395, respectively.
A country that receives no new immigrants is very dierent from one absorbing them at the
rate of one percent per year. Yet those dierences are hardly manifested in the behaviour of
additional accumulation of debt or new tax rates presented above. Certainly in this example, it
cannot be said that the ow of immigrants serves to dilute public debt. Yet though dierences
in rates of immigration barely alter the path of debt or subsequant tax rates on labour earnings,
it is the rate of immigration that determines the impact upon the welfare of the population
already resident in the country of a policy to permanently increase transfer payments for all,
while resorting to decit nance over a prolonged period to pay for them.
To demonstrate, I plot the impulse responses in Figure 4 for the rate of return on assets
following the increase in transfer spending for both T = 40 and T = 70. Note how in each
example the magnitude of the response directly relates to the rate of immigration. To see why,
note that the last term in (9),  (t) ~k (t) where  (t) > 0, multiplied by the rate of immigration
m (t) and corrected by the term that governs the relative productivity of new immigrants P (t)(t)(t) ,
captures the dynamic form of the immigration surplus|a measure of how the supply of labour
provided by immigrant workers complements the stock of native-owned capital and raises its
rate of return. For our baseline case, where T = 40, each unit increment in the underlying
rate of immigration, from zero to ten per thousand, corresponds to between one and a half
and two basis points in the long-run response of the rate of return on assets that follows the
increase in spending of one and a half percent of output. These higher rates of return boost
the growth rate of each household's consumption in (4). This eect might seem small, but it is
cumulative, and generates a large enough wealth eect, that upon impact, consumption in the
sixth (penultimate) column of Table 1 increases despite the anticipated rise in interest rates.
This does not mean that the boost to the immigration surplus is a Pareto improving shift
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New  Debt  Debt Labour Initial Welfare as
Immigrants as Percent as Percent Tax Change Percent of
Per of Output of Output Rate in Native Permanent
Thousand at T : Long-Run after T Consumption Consumption
100 b(T )y(T ) 100 b(1)y(1) h(t > T ) 100

c(0;0)
c(0;0)   1

pm;T
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0
2
4
6
8
10
103:2
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104:0
104:4
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105:3
103:2
103:5
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104:1
104:4
104:7
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0:308
0:308
0:309
0:309
0:310
0
0:010
0:021
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0:046
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0
0:166
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0:470
0:611
0:744
T = 55
0
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181:7
183:3
184:9
177:6
178:4
179:4
180:3
181:4
182:5
0:337
0:338
0:339
0:340
0:342
0:343
0
0:013
0:022
0:034
0:047
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0
0:226
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T = 70
0
2
4
6
8
10
285:9
289:5
293:4
297:8
302:5
307:6
285:9
288:2
290:7
293:5
296:4
299:6
0:381
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0:386
0:388
0:391
0:395
0
0:013
0:022
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0
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1:197
Table 1: Increasing transfer payments by 1.5% of output and then raising tax rate on wage
earnings in T=40, 55 or 70 years.
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Figure 5: The values of the welfare measure for native households pm;T that correspond to
dierent rates of immigration after increasing transfer payments by 1.5% of output and then
raising tax rate on wage earnings in T=40, 55 or 70 years.
towards dynamic eciency. The rate of return to capital is always higher than the growth
rate of the economy. Instead, new immigrants pay higher taxes on their earnings to service
the debt accumulated before they arrived. As public debt gradually crowds out some invest-
ment in physical capital, so pre-tax wages, upon which immigrants who arrive with few assets
disproportionately rely, also decline.
By maximising the welfare of those resident at time t=0, I mean maximising the intertem-
poral utility of the innite-lived dynasties. It must be emphasized that this is not a mechanism
for intergenerational redistribution or conict. Policy makers are implicitly concerned not only
with the welfare of today's population but with the welfare of all of its descendants. The only
people whose interests I assume are ignored are those of the future immigrants yet to arrive in
the country at the time when the policy is determined, as well as their descendents.13
13Even if the policy were re-evaluated in each period, and immigration were the sole source of all population
growth, it would take more than seventy years for the accumulated stock of new immigrants who arrive after t=0
to form a majority. Hence policies that serve the interests of the entire population when they are introduced,
though not strictly time consistent because of the presence of capital in the economy, do benet the majority of
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To measure the welfare implications of these policies I compare the discounted welfare gen-
erated by the evolution of c(0; t), the per-capita consumption of anyone already resident in the
country at time t=0, against the discounted welfare generated by the analogous counterfactual
consumption path c(0; t), were the initial policy of budget balance to remain in force:
Z 1
0
e(n )t ln c (0; t) dt =
Z 1
0
e(n )t ln
h
1 +
pm;T
100

c(0; t)
i
dt: (16)
The dierence between the two, the welfare eect, is measured as a compensating dierential|a
permanent percentage pm;;T of consumption sucient to compensate native households for not
deviating from the baseline scal policy. Inserting (4) into (16) and solving for pm;T yields:
pm;T = 100

c (0; 0)
c (0; 0)
e
( n) R10 R t0 e(n )t((1 k(v))r(v))dvdt  (1 k)r n   1

: (17)
The values of pm;;T that correspond to the policy of increased spending on transfers are
listed in the last column of Table 1, and it is here where beyond the direct impact on native
welfare of receiving higher transfer payments partly funded by taxes paid by future immigrants,
the changes to the rate of return to capital associated with dierent rates of immigration also
nd their expression. For the case where the debt is stabilised after forty years, the benet
that accrues to the native population is equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of
0.166% if the rate of immigration is two per thousand. Double the rate of immigration to four
per thousand and the benet nearly doubles as well to 0.322%. Figure 5 illustrates the near
linear relationship between the rate of immigration and the value of pm;T associated with this
particular policy. Increase the time span between the rise in expenditures and the rise in the
taxes to pay for them by fteen or thirty years, and the corresponding welfare benet climbs to
0.226% and 0.435% or 0.284% and 0.544%. If as explained in Section 2, the rates of immigration
that best capture the contribution of immigration to population growth are between eight and
ten per thousand, then the welfare benets natives enjoy approach the equivalent of permanently
raising consumption by one percent.
the population for far longer than the highest value of T in my simulations.
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Figure 6: The values of the welfare measure for native households pm;T and the long-term
debt burden generated by increasing transfer payments and then raising the tax rate on wage
earnings in T=40 or 70 years, for dierent annual rates of immigration per thousand.
To achieve welfare gains signicantly higher requires a far more aggressive degree of decit
spending. This is certainly a theoretical possibility|the curves, corresponding to annual rates
of immigration of zero, two, four, six eight and ten per thousand, in both panels in Figure 6
illustrate that for a given value of T and rate of migrationm, there is a nearly linear relationship
between changes to the long-run debt burden and the corresponding welfare measure pm;;T .
The curves labeled m=0 are horizontal lines, as shifting transfers and labour taxes across time
if the economy is not absorbing new immigrants is Ricardian neutral, but the slopes of the
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remaining curves are positive and increasing in the rate of immigration. A permanent increase
in transfer payments that causes the debt burden to climb by 195% of output in the space
of seventy years, a trajectory that matches the predictions of the CBO's Alternative Fiscal
Scenario, corresponds to a welfare gain equivalent to a 0.6% increase in consumption if the
eective rate of immigration is eight per thousand, and 0.7% if the rate of immigration is ten.
Assume the debt reaches 500% instead (setting aside the practical limitations of sustaining a
debt of this magnitude), and the corresponding welfare measures are 1.5% and 1.8%. Note also
that between 2007 and 2014, the gap between the wages of newly arrived immigrants and all
other workers contracted from 23.2% to only 10.1%. Native workers would stand to benet
more if this improvement in the relative productivity of immigrant workers continues. Were
there no productivity gap between new immigrants and native workers, the welfare measures
associated with the debt burden rising 195% in seventy years are 0.7% and 0.9%, again for
rates of migration equivalent to eight or ten per thousand. Finally, the longer a given tax
cut prevails, the more natives benet, but the larger the number of immigrant cohorts that
arrive immediately after who also share some of the gains. This is why, as Figure 6 illustrates,
natives benet most from steeper tax cuts over shorter time spans. For a given long-run debt
burden, the smaller the value of T , the higher values of pm;T . We are left with a puzzle|from
the perspective of the native population, the scope for increasing transfer payments and using
decit nance to enhance their own welfare is underutilised. There appear to be constraints on
the accumulation of debt beyond the scope of the model.
4 Intertemporal Shifts in the Tax on Asset Income
In an optimal growth model, the long-run supply of capital is innitely elastic, so uctua-
tions in the tax on income from capital have the greatest potential to increase excess burden.
Nonetheless, when the economy is absorbing new immigrants the gains that accrue to the native
population from shifting these taxes to the future will usually dominate the deadweight loss.
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Consider the eect of lowering the tax rate on asset income from 0.32 (chosen to match the
average rate that prevailed between 1966 and 1980) to 0.27 (the average rate from 1981 till 2014),
for T=40, 55 or 70 years. This is equivalent to assuming that a policy of scal consolidation to
stabilise the government budget will commence either at the end of this decade in 2020, fteen
years later in 2035, or mid-century in 2050, when again, according to the Alternative Fiscal
Scenario published by the CBO, the debt will approach what it deems to be the unsustainable
level corresponding to 250% of output.
Comparing the third and fourth columns in Tables 1 and 2, this policy generates changes in
the debt burden that are roughly comparable to those associated with an increase in transfer
spending of one and a half percent of output analysed in Section 3, particularly for higher
values of T . However, there is an important dierence: unlike the case of intertemporal shifts
in transfers and wage taxation, here the rate of return on capital is not only gradually and
indirectly aected by the accumulation of debt through (11), but immediately and directly
through (9). Hence the impulse responses in Figure 4 describing the behaviour of the net
rate of return on assets bear little resemblance to those in Figure 7. The after-tax rate of
return rises by approximately 39 to 40 basis points on impact. From this moment it begins
to decline, the eect of the lower tax rate on savings and the accumulation of physical capital
initially dominating any crowding out from the growing burden of public debt, before reversing
direction again and increasing as the date T draws closer, and agents reduce investment in
new capital in anticipation of the higher taxes they will soon pay. Though dicult to discern
given the scale of the shifts in the impulse responses over time, comparing any two, the one
that corresponds to a higher rate of immigration dominates its counterpart at every point in
time. Ultimately, in the very long run, after all the uctuations, if the rate of immigration is
positive, higher debt translates into permanently higher rates of return, even after accounting
for the higher taxes paid on it (listed in the sixth column of Table 2), but only after a period
of transition that lasts for decades long after T . In the initial response to this type of policy, in
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contrast to cuts in labour taxes or increases in transfer payments, here the substitution eect
dominates any income eect|natives immediately lower consumption by 3.052 to 3.307% to
take advantage of the higher rates of return.
Using the formula (17) to compute welfare, in the absence of immigration, there would be
no justication visible in the last column of Table 2 for the policy adopted in the early 1980's
of lowering the rate of taxation on asset income, if in fact it is only to be raised sometime in the
future. As the debt burden increases by 96.9%, 174.6% or 302.1% of output over the course of
T=40, 55 or 70 years, the losses in welfare correspond to permanent drops of -0.187%, -0.313%
or -0.523% in permanent consumption. Indeed, this particulary policy only generates positive
values of pm;T in Figure 8 if the eective rate of immigration is higher than two to three per
thousand. The distortionary eect of allowing this tax to uctuate so much overwhelms the
benets of sharing the higher future tax burden with immigrants.
To illustrate this trade-o, I plot the values of pm;T in Figure 9 that correspond to dierent
changes in the debt burden.14 Unlike shifting the tax burden on labour earnings in Figure 6,
here the relationship is no longer monotonic. Instead, for each length of time T and rate of
immigration m, the value of pm;T increases the larger the long-term debt burden, but only to
a point, after which the values decline and some eventually become negative. For the native
population, temporary tax cuts are generally benecial but only to a point. Table 3 lists the
long-term change in the debt burden and welfare eects that correspond to the maximum
compensating dierentials pm;T for each curve in Figure 9 along with the change in debt at
time T , the tax rates on capital that prevail both between time zero and T and after T , and
the initial change in consumption chosen by natives on impact.
14The endogeneity of capital supply means there is a Laer curve that determines the amount of revenue the
government can raise through higher taxes on capital income, and this in turn implies an upper limit on the
amount of debt the government can accumulate by shifting this tax rate alone across time. This means future
tax rates can be set no higher than 0.79, a range sucient to service maximum debts of between 576% (when
immigration is ten per thousand) and 609% of output.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses for the net rate of return, change in basis points, for dierent
annual rates of immigration, after temporarily lowering the tax rate on asset income from 0.32
to 0.27, for T=40 or 70 years.
Once again the shapes of the curves labeled m=0, this time in Figure 9, tells us what would
be the optimal policy if the economy were not absorbing any immigrants at all. The logic of
Harberger's triangle nearly prevails|as in Lucas and Stokey (1983), in their model without
capital, the convexity of the excess burden with respect to the tax rate implies the best policy
is to smooth the tax rate over time, and not depart from steady state. However, there are two
reasons why slight deviations from tax smoothing generate small welfare benets here. First, the
short-run supply of capital is inelastic, so the lump-sum property of taxing it immediately at a
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Figure 8: The values of the welfare measure for native households pm;T that correspond to
dierent rates of immigration after temporarily lowering the tax rate on asset income from 0.32
to 0.27 and then raising it after T=40, 55 or 70 years.
higher rate is benecial, particularly if the additional revenue is applied to a partial redemption
of public debt, enabling lower taxes in the future.15 Second, the model is not calibrated around
the Ramsey second-best optimal policy|the tax rate on capital is higher than the share of
government expenditure in output.16 Raising the tax rate from period zero to T means that in
the long run the economy will converge closer to a steady state that is Ramsey-optimal. These
two reasons are why, in the absence of immigration, a policy that raises the tax on asset income
in the short run to redeem part of the debt generates a very small welfare benet.
As in Section 3, here too the lower the value of T , the smaller the number of immigrants
who experience the period of lower taxation, which is why ceteris paribus, the quick accumu-
lation of extra debt through steep cuts in labour taxation dominates a more gradual policy of
longer duration. Here, however, there is a countervailing tax smoothing argument in favour of
15This is a direct implication of Theorem 3 in Chamley (1986).
16Because government expenditure in not a xed amount but a fraction g of net output, the second-best long-
run optimal policy is not the familiar Chamley-Judd result of eliminating the tax on income from capital and
placing the burden of government nance on labor, but rather to set all taxes equal to g. See Ben-Gad (2014).
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accumulating debt more gradually, through smaller tax cuts of longer duration. That is why
for a given change in the long-run burden of debt, the value of pm;T in Figure 9 is much less
sensitive to dierent values of T than it is in Figure 6.
Note also that the vertical scale for the panels in Figure 6 is about three times higher than
in Figure 9, so overall there is far less scope for using decit nance for the benet of native
households when policy makers are constrained to shifting the tax rate on asset income rather
than labour earnings across time. If the rate of immigration is only two per thousand, and the
scal gap is closed in T=40 years, then cutting the tax rate on capital income from 0.32 to 0.302
maximises the welfare of the native population. The debt burden increases by 31.7% of output
to 54.4% from its initial value 22.7% of output once the economy has fully converged to its
new balanced growth path. The welfare benet is small, equivalent to permanently increasing
consumption by only 0.009%. If the rate of immigration doubles to four instead of two per
thousand, the maximum welfare benet rises to 0.15%, which is attained by rst lowering the
tax rate to 0.271. If the rate of immigration is doubled once more to eight per thousand, then
the value of pm;T climbs to 0.536%. Higher values of T mean the long-run debt rises more even
though tax rates uctuate less, but the magnitudes of pm;T do not change much.
Table 3 describes the particular intertemporal shifts in the burden of capital taxation that
maximise the welfare of the native population across dierent values of m and T . The closest
match between the tax policy of cutting the tax rate from 0.320 to 0.27, chosen as roughly anal-
ogous to one element of recent US scal history, and the welfare maximising policies described
in Table 3, occurs when the rate of immigration is eight per thousand and scal consolidation
is postponed till T = 70. To further illustrate this point, in Figure 10, I plot the behaviour of
the debt burden, measured in terms of GDP (rather than output, which here includes services
from consumption goods), that corresponds to each of the maximising policies in Table 3 for
the case where T=70, against both the historical record and its predicted path according to the
Alternative Fiscal Scenario produced by the CBO.
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 0:097
0:110
0:300
0:475
0:636
T = 70
0
2
4
6
8
10
302:1
304:2
306:7
309:5
312:5
315:9
272:1
273:4
274:9
276:7
278:7
280:8
0:561
0:564
0:567
0:570
0:573
0:577
 3:307
 3:274
 3:239
 3:201
 3:162
 3:123
 0:523
 0:235
0:035
0:278
0:499
0:699
Table 2: The impact of temporarily lowering the tax rate on asset income by 5%.
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New  Debt  Debt Capital Capital Initial Welfare as
Immigrants as Percent as Percent Tax Tax Change Percent of
Per of Output of Output Rate Rate in Native Permanent
Thousand at T : Long-Run before T after T Consumption Consumption
100 b(T )y(T ) 100 b(1)y(1) k(t < T ) k(t > T ) 100

c(0;0)
c(0;0)   1

pm;T
T = 40
0
2
4
6
8
10
 23:8
32:6
94:5
157:1
221:7
281:8
 24:1
31:7
88:7
143:3
197:6
247:4
0:334
0:302
0:271
0:243
0:217
0:195
0:295
0:352
0:402
0:458
0:507
0:550
0:929
 1:166
 3:099
 4:757
 6:217
 7:380
0:009
0:015
0:114
0:292
0:536
0:833
T = 55
0
2
4
6
8
10
 20:5
50:3
124:4
200:7
278:1
360:8
 20:7
48:8
116:4
182:5
247:5
316:9
0:327
0:304
0:283
0:264
0:247
0:231
0:299
0:369
0:433
0:493
0:549
0:604
0:472
 1:058
 2:398
 3:559
 4:550
 5:440
0:005
0:022
0:127
0:304
0:536
0:812
T = 70
0
2
4
6
8
10
 18:9
66:4
154:1
249:4
345:0
457:1
 19:0
64:1
143:6
225:6
306:3
404:3
0:324
0:307
0:292
0:278
0:266
0:254
0:301
0:383
0:458
0:529
0:594
0:663
0:270
 0:864
 1:830
 2:698
 3:410
 4:093
0:002
0:025
0:128
0:292
0:502
0:747
Table 3: Temporarily lowering the tax rate on asset income to maximise welfare.
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Figure 9: The values of the welfare measure for native households pm;T and the long-term debt
burden generated by temporarily lowering the tax rate on asset income for T=40 or 70 years,
for dierent annual rates of immigration.
Of course there is no reason to assume that if at a given moment policy makers choose
to lower a particular tax, it is this same tax that decades later will be adjusted to ultimately
stabilise the government's nances. In the next section, I analyse the degree to which the
qualitative and quantitative results here and in Section 3 might be altered when the government
switches between the two tax instruments.
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Figure 10: The trajectory of the ratio of bonds to GDP values generated by temporarily lowering
the tax rate on asset income for T=70 years for dierent annual rates of immigration. In the
background in grey is the ratio of publicly-held debt to GDP from 1946 to 2015, and the CBO's
Alternative Fiscal Scenario from 2016 to 2054.
5 Shifting Taxes Between Labour and Asset Income
Just as in Figure 6, the panels in Figure 11 represent the relationship between changes in
the long-run debt burden following a sustained period when spending on transfer payments
changes. The only dierence is that now, rather than shifting the tax on labour earnings
after T to satisfy (15), at time T = 40, 55, or 70 it is the tax rate on capital that changes.
Given the way I calibrated the model, setting =1 and =1, the incidence of the tax on asset
income falls most heavily on natives and the tax on labour earnings on new immigrants, so any
shift in the burden from labour to capital clearly does not favour the interests of the native
population. Furthermore, the shift to higher capital taxation in the future entails an increase
in the excess burden borne by everyone. Yet, even under these circumstances, provided the
rate of immigration is suciently high, the value of pm;T still increases if taxes on asset income
ultimately rise to nance either more transfer spending or lower taxes on labour earnings, as
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long as the two changes are separated by a prolonged period of decit nance.
These caveats are important. If the rate of immigration is only two per thousand, lower
spending on transfers and lower debt is the preferred policy; reducing excess burden dominates
the small benets that can be derived from shifting the tax burden to the future. Furthermore,
the maximum values attained by pm;T in Figure 11 are much lower than in the previous examples
in Sections 3 or 4. The highest possible value of pm;T , equivalent to a 0.338% increase in
consumption, is attained in the lowest right-hand panel of Figure 11, when transfer payments
rise by 1.016% of output. After seventy years and after the debt burden has risen by 252.3% of
output, the tax on capital must be raised to 0.574 to stabilise government nances. What if we
reverse this sequence so that lower tax rates on asset income are eventually paid for with higher
taxes on labour? Indeed, how much might natives stand to gain if sometime in the future, the
instrument chosen to replace the revenue lost from the drop from 0.32 to 0.27 in the tax rate
on capital since the early 1980's is an increase in the taxes on wages?
Even in the absence of immigration, shifting the burden of taxation from the innitely
elastic capital to inelastic labour|even if this is done with a very long lag and public debt
accumulates in the interim|generates small reductions in the excess burden that yield welfare
benets equivalent to permanently increasing consumption between 0.193% and 0.198%. Both
this eect and the shift in the incidence of the tax from native-owned assets reinforce the
benet that accrues to the members of native households when taxes are postponed to the
future. This is why the curves in Figure 12 are uniformly higher than their counterparts in
Figure 8. Comparing the third and fourth columns in Table 2 and 4, the same decrease in
the tax on capital also implies a smaller increase in the debt burden, because the permanently
lowered tax on capital income incentivises higher investment.
Suppose again the eective rate of immigration of between eight and ten per thousand.
Assume as well that the current low tax rates on capital income introduced in the early 1980's
are permanent. If the debt continues to rise until 2050, before the government stabilises its
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Figure 11: The values of the welfare measure for native households pm;;T and the long-term
debt burden generated by increasing transfer payments and then raising the tax rate on asset
income in T=40 or 70 years, for dierent annual rates of immigration.
nances and does so by raising the tax on labour earnings, the value of pm;T is between 1.026%
and 1.195%, and possibly a bit more if the productivity of new immigrants continues to improve.
From the perspective of the initial population, those whose families were already resident in
the United States in 1981, this is a small but not inconsequential benet. Along the way the
debt burden grows between 237.8% and 239.2% of output, and when added to the initial debt
burden of 22.7% is a fairly close match to the projections of the Extended Baseline Scenario in
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Figure 12: The values of the welfare measure for native households pm;T that correspond to
dierent rates of immigration after lowering the tax rate on asset income from 0.32 to 0.27 and
then raising the tax rate on wage earnings after T=40, 55 or 70 years.
Figure 2. Of course the monotonic relationship between more debt and higher values of pm;T
in Figure 13 leaves us with the same question rst raised in Section 3. What are the additional
objectives or constraints, absent from the model, that prevent policy makers from relying even
more heavily on decit nance than is already the case?
Still, in Figure 13 we see once again a monotonic relationship between more debt and higher
values of pm;T as in Figure 6 in Section 3. Unlike the temporary reductions in the tax rate on
capital income in Section 4, the permanent reductions here mean that as in Figure 6, there is a
positive monotonic relationship between the increase in long-run debt and the values of pm;T in
Figure 13. In fact, because of the shift in incidence and the reduction in the excess burden of
capital income tax, the slopes are steeper. As is Section 3, recent policy clearly benets native
households, but were this the only consideration for policy makers the debt would be climbing
even faster.
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New  Debt  Debt Labour Initial Welfare as
Immigrants as Percent as Percent Tax Change Percent of
Per of Output of Output Rate in Native Permanent
Thousand at T : Long-Run after T Consumption Consumption
100 b(T )y(T ) 100 b(1)y(1) h(t > T ) 100

c(0;0)
c(0;0)   1

pm;T
T = 40
0
2
4
6
8
10
86:1
86:1
86:0
86:0
86:0
86:0
84:7
84:6
84:5
84:4
84:3
84:2
0:270
0:270
0:271
0:271
0:271
0:271
 0:033
 0:033
 0:032
 0:032
 0:032
 0:031
0:193
0:322
0:457
0:586
0:708
0:824
T = 55
0
2
4
6
8
10
147:7
148:0
148:5
149:0
149:6
150:3
145:4
145:4
145:6
145:8
146:0
146:2
0:295
0:295
0:296
0:296
0:296
0:297
 0:033
 0:033
 0:032
 0:032
 0:032
 0:031
0:196
0:372
0:551
0:717
0:872
1:017
T = 70
0
2
4
6
8
10
237:2
238:9
240:9
243:2
245:7
248:4
233:7
234:5
235:4
236:5
237:8
239:2
0:330
0:332
0:333
0:334
0:336
0:338
 0:033
 0:033
 0:032
 0:032
 0:032
 0:031
0:198
0:421
0:641
0:842
1:026
1:195
Table 4: The impact of permanently lowering the tax rate on asset income by 5% and then
raising the tax rate on wage earnings from year T on.
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6 Discussion
In each panel in Figures 6 and 9 all the curves associated with strictly positive rates of immi-
gration decline monotonically to the left of zero on the horizontal axis. This means that if the
economy is absorbing even small numbers of immigrants, temporarily raising a particular tax
rate to accumulate surpluses before lowering that same tax after time t = T reduces welfare for
the initial population. Indeed, the higher the rate of immigration, the more such a policy shifts
the tax burden from future immigrants and towards the initial population. What this implies
is that economies that are absorbing relatively larger numbers of new immigrants are unlikely
to run sustained budget surpluses to enable future reductions in tax. Instead, we should expect
to observe a bias in favour of postponing taxation and decit nance.
In the aftermath of World War II, in every year but three (1949, 1954 and 1958), the debt-
to-GDP ratio declined as the US government retired its wartime debt, until the end of 1974,
when it reached a postwar low of 24.6%. The year 1981, the year President Ronald Reagan
took oce, was a turning point. In every one of the subsequent 13 years, the percentage of debt
to GDP rose, until it had nearly doubled to 49.5% at the end of 1993. Increased spending on
defense played a small role|it averaged 5.7% of GDP during the eight years of the Reagan
administration, compared to only 5% during the eight years that preceded it. Still, as is readily
apparent in Figure 1, the defense burden remained well below the average of 9.3% that prevailed
during the 1950's and 1960's.
The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent wars in both
Afghanistan and Iraq prompted quick increases in defense spending, though not a resumption
of the rates of spending that preceded the end of the Cold War|from 2002 to 2015 spending
on defense averaged 3.9% of GDP, compared to 3.6% that prevailed during the rst decade that
followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union.17 At the same time revenue fell sharply, initially
17The CBO assumes the defense burden will decline until it stabilises to only 2.6% of GDP in 2025, but this
does little to prevent the exponential growth of the debt in either of its forecasts.
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Figure 13: The values of the welfare measure for native households pm;;T and the long-term
debt burden generated by permanently lowering the tax rate on asset income and then raising
the rate of tax on wage earnings after T=40 or 70 years, for dierent annual rates of immigration.
because President George W. Bush lowered tax rates, but later as a consequence of the recession
that began in 2008. By the end of 2015 publicly-held debt was 73.1% of GDP.
Yet beyond all this, the most important and consistent feature of the US Federal budget
during the last few decades is the growth in spending on entitlement programmes, whose main
beneciaries are the elderly. This is particularly the case for Medicare; and unlike the vagaries
of war and recession, this growth was completely predictable|a consequence of increasing life
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expectancy and dropping fertility. Instead of accumulating sucient surpluses to nance these
liabilities we observe a shift towards decit nance that immediately follows the rapid decline in
both natural population growth and fertility in Figure 3. Passage of the Medicare Modernization
Act at the end of 2003 extended coverage to include the cost of prescription drugs for the elderly
from 2006 onward, and further exacerbated the scal gap.
Indeed, it bears emphasising that just as the debt rst began to rise, in 1982 the US Census
Bureau was warning that the population was ageing rapidly and would begin contracting by
the year 2050|replacing earlier worries about overpopulation. A year earlier, the President
and Congress appointed Alan Greenspan to chair The National Commission on Social Security
Reform. The immediate task of the commission was to prevent the near-term insolvency of the
Social Security Trust Fund, but also oered recommendations on how the programme could
be stabilised for the long term, given the sharp drop in population growth. The commission's
recommendations, which included a two-year rise in the retirement age to be implemented by
2026, were adopted in 1983, but did little to stabilise the programme's long-term prospects.
This was also the last time major legislation was passed, despite the rising dependency ratio,
that curtailed entitlement spending on the elderly.
The simulations and welfare calculations in Sections 3 to 5 demonstrate that the model can
explain at least part of the motivation behind not only the accumulation of public debt in the
United States so far but even the more rapid accumulation predicted in the CBO's Alternative
Fiscal Scenario. Indeed, in the absence of immigration, it is hard to rationalise the implied shift
of the tax burden, particularly on asset income, across time.
7 Conclusion
The decision to leave tax rates low, particularly the tax rate on asset income, and as a con-
sequence to continue to accumulate both formal debt and unfunded liabilities, is a political
choice. I believe my model oers at least some insight as to why for the rst time in US history,
40
the debt burden has risen in a sustained manner during peace-time, and why there seems little
immediate prospect of a change in direction. It is of course the case that the trajectory of
public debt is the result of decision-making and political processes that are far more dynamic,
and far more contingent on unforeseen circumstances, than I assume in my model. It is very
unlikely that voters, or their representatives, deliberately choose policies that carefully weigh
the costs and benets of decit nance, as rates of migration change, in the manner of the
model. However, it is not too hard to imagine that concerns about the rising burden of debt,
and its impact on the next generation, are likely to be less persuasive at a time when citizens
experience the composition of their societies transforming so quickly. What my model demon-
strates is that ceteris paribus, there is likely to be far greater willingness to defer taxes and
rely on decit spending during periods when immigration is a more prominent component of
population growth.
That people voting for a set of tax policies in one period may not be exactly the same people
who must pay these taxes in the next is not an uncommon feature in models associated with
dynamic scal policy. What is dierent here is that by adopting the Weil (1989) framework,
I provide an alternative to the strict dichotomy between models with overlapping generations,
where agents disregard the impact of their choices on future generations, and the quasi-Ricardian
world of innite-lived dynasties in which agents are assumed to fully participate in both the
economy and the political system in every period. In the case where taxation is distortionary,
gone also is the option to simply choose the tax that redistributes the most income to those who
can organize the most votes, while abstracting from deadweight loss. As recent experience has
shown, prolonged reliance on decit nance has real consequences. The higher rates of future
taxation in my model are only one possible outcome, and clearly not the most dire.
The degree to which the policy choices made in any given period are informed by their eects
on future generations is hardly straightforward, even if people never move between dierent po-
litical jurisdictions. Concern for one's own descendants is not the only form of intergenerational
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altruism. People without children may care deeply about the welfare of future members of the
society in which they live, and do not necessarily support policies that maximise their own
welfare at the expense of the young and the unborn:
Society is indeed a contract......It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in
all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a
partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not
only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are
dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a
clause in the great primval contract of eternal society,.....
(Edmund Burke, 1790, pp. 143-144)
Yet most transfers between people, whether inter vivos or testamentary, take place between
members of the same family. My contention is that immigration creates a certain bias in favor
of decit nance, though this argument could be turned on its head; decit nance is what
generates a preference for accommodating more immigrants. Indeed, perhaps one reason we
do not observe developed countries absorbing yet more immigrants follows indirectly from the
model|the faster immigrants arrive, the more natives may want the government to issue bonds
to cover immediate government expenditure, but also the greater the risk that the immigrants
will acquire the political power to repudiate that very same debt.
If immigration does indeed create a bias in favour of decit nance, there is no reason to
assume the phenomenon is isolated to the United States. In many developed countries, the
transition from low rates of net migration and high rates of natural population growth to high
net migration and low, even negative, rates of natural population growth has been far more
extreme. So too has the accumulation of public debt and unfunded liabilities.
One last issue is emigration. At any given moment, migration ows at the national level
tend to be one-way. Only occasionally do we observe so-called `replacement migration' in which
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a country absorbs signicant numbers of new workers even as its own native-born workers move
elsewhere. Emigration could create a bias in favor of surpluses|tax people before they leave|
but only if the rate of emigration does not exceed a certain threshold. If enough people are
leaving, or anticipate they will, they may opt to avoid taxing themselves, and leave behind their
share of the public debt to those who remain. Of course, at the sub-national and local level,
simultaneous ows of inmigration and outmigration are the normal consequence of churning
in the labor market. One implication is that as people become more mobile, we may expect
not only national governments, but the dierent regions within federal states and localities to
acquire higher debt and unfunded liabilities.
City, University of London
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